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For two decades, the ‘pillars’ policy of the Australian Government has endured with bipartisan support. 
The original policy intention was to promote competition by preserving the separation of Australia’s four 
major banks and two largest insurance companies.  
Post the global financial crisis (GFC), what is now the ‘four pillars’ policy creates significant incumbency 
value for the major banks, which collectively dominate the market in retail banking and lending to non-
financial corporations.  
This paper assesses the level of competition in retail banking in Australia, against a backdrop of options 
for facilitating greater competition in the interests of consumer welfare. 
In any market, vibrant competition depends on empowered consumers. However, in order to exercise the 
power of choice, consumers need to be able to use the latent threat of switching to an alternative provider 
of goods or services. Furthermore, they should ideally have a low-cost switching option.  
Although consumer protection in Australia is highly evolved and effective, the incidence of account 
switching in retail banking remains low. This is of particular concern because the supply side of the market 
is concentrated, and is likely to remain so, as a result of government policy. In effect, this policy is seen to 
provide an implicit government guarantee for the banks, and may run counter to promoting competition in 
the interests of consumers. Additionally, the policy relies on the assumption that competition is sufficient 
to deliver economic outcomes that include innovation and consumer welfare.  
In 2010, the Federal Government announced banking reforms designed to, among other things, facilitate 
consumers switching their accounts between banks. The initiative to facilitate switching was intended to 
reduce the costs inherent in changing banking accounts.  
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) considers substitution as its primary 
measure of markets. It then examines markets by considering product, geographic and temporal 
dimensions. With a view to analysing competition, this study adopts the approach taken by the ACCC. 
Market concentration, in common with several other measures, indicates that the level of competition in 
Australian retail banking has declined over the decade that encompassed the GFC. Moreover, it may no 
longer support broader economic outcomes such as consumer-beneficial innovation and optimal consumer 
welfare.  
The four pillars policy creates a barrier to exit for each of the four major banks, except by way of a trade 
sale to an international bank, which would be subject to approval by the Australian Prudential Regulation 
 
 
 
 
Authority (APRA) and the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). The policy has also led to a degree of 
vertical integration in the banking sector, particularly in the sale of mortgage products. Specifically, the 
proportion of loans provided by banks other than the four majors, and by the non-bank mortgage sector, 
has contracted in the wake of the GFC. Moreover, there has been a contraction in the diversity of mortgage 
intermediaries, with Commonwealth Bank acquiring 80% of Aussie Home Loans and Westpac acquiring 
RAMS’ brand and distribution business.  
Within the constraints of the four pillars policy, there have been post-GFC acquisitions by the major banks, 
with Westpac acquiring St George Bank and Commonwealth Bank acquiring BankWest. There has also been 
a significant amount of horizontal integration in the sector, particularly within the areas of wealth 
management, insurance and specialised finance.  
There are major issues that flow from horizontal and vertical integration in the banking sector. Primarily, 
systemic risk becomes more domesticated, and thereby crosses multiple elements of the Australian 
financial system. For example, National Australia Bank provides banking, wealth management, insurance 
and a range of wholesale superannuation products and services. Accordingly, the bank has the potential to 
be ‘too big to fail’ not because of its banking operations, but due to its impact in the superannuation sector. 
Although originally intended to preserve competition, the four pillars policy may now be seen as counter-
productive to that purpose. This is because it creates considerable incumbency value through being read as 
an implicit government guarantee for these firms. Moreover, while effective consumer choice is essential 
to effective competition, evidence shows consumer inertia at a level which suggests that not enough is 
being done to facilitate choice in retail banking, thereby further entrenching the positions of the four 
majors. 
Current legislation positions regulation with a reactive focus on a case-by-case evaluation of what may 
substantially lessen competition, without requiring any proactive examination of whether prevailing 
competitive conditions appear adequate. Short of policy change to address such issues, there are two 
consequences that call for a response: 
 Un-actioned opportunities to better enable and inform consumer choice, such as bank account 
number portability and consumers’ access to their own banking data; and 
 Risks arising from regulatory blind spots, that leave emerging lending channels unregulated and 
allow stability to trump competition without formally assessing competition levels to account for 
the costs of insufficient competition.  
These outcomes are well worthwhile the attention of researchers, regulators and policy makers alike. 
